

Transformation through Teaching (*jiaohua* 教化)¹

(Adapted from TJ Hinrichs, *Shamans, Witchcraft, and Quarantine: The Medical Transformation of Governance and Southern Customs in Song China*, book manuscript)

June 27, 2014

How does an empire retain control of conquered territories without maintaining an expensive occupation army and police force? One approach is to grant conquered domains as fiefs to trusted subordinates, in effect delegating control, the approach of the Shang and Zhou. The Qin is known for having attempted something closer to totalitarian bureaucratic and legal control. The Han at first combined the two systems, enfeoffing some regions to family and loyal generals, and ruling other areas directly through centrally appointed officials. Gradually, though, the Han court abolished enfeoffed domains and put them under direct central rule. From early in its rule, the Han also employed “softer” approaches to governance of its far-flung populations, ones based on the idea of

“transformation through teaching.” Theorists posed “transformation” as a positive and pervasive political effect, and contrasted it to the inherently limited and unstable outcomes of coercive methods.²

The *Analects* (*Lunyu*) set key parameters of the formulation, focusing power in the central position of the ruler, and at the same time emptying that role of coercive force.³ The *Analects* advocated governance by potency-cum-virtue (*de* 德) operating through ritual propriety (*li* 禮), and opposed rule by laws and punishments:

Guide [the people] by means of rules and order them (*qi* 齊) [literally, make them uniform] through punishments, and the people will evade [your

¹ I translate the *jiao* of *jiaohua* variously as “teaching” to convey its most general sense, which can include scholarly teaching but also non-activist transformation, possibly through emulation of sagely exemplars; as “instruction” for direct explication and exhortation, most often directed at commoners; and as “education” for more formal scholarly projects aimed at literate ruling elites.

² While the comparison is rough at best, we can see resemblances between the transformation-coercion binary formulated by Warring States and Han theorists, and the opposition developed by Michel Foucault between purportedly earlier “deductive” sovereign power over death and modern powers over life. See “Right of Death and Power Over Life,” *History of Sexuality Vol. I: An Introduction*, (New York: Random House, 1990), 135-159. Differing from Foucault’s analysis, transformative governance did not entail the creation of the population as an object of statistical knowledge and regulation, and did not attempt to discipline biologically-constructed bodies. Transformative governance did, though, purport to nurture and shape the lives of “the people” (*min*), including through ritual disciplines (in the more general rather than restricted Foucauldian sense).

³ The *Analects* consists of sayings attributed to Confucius (551-479 C.E.), recorded and compiled by his disciples in the century or two following his death.

governance] and will lack any sense of shame.

Guide them through virtue and order them through rites, and they will have a sense of shame and will also regulate themselves.⁴

Royal ritual began with cosmic alignment: the ruler was to orient himself with the pole star and “face south” (from this position, everywhere); All under Heaven would then revolve around and submit to him.⁵ Correcting himself internally, and without further action (*wuwei* 無為), the ruler’s virtue would bend all before it smoothly and unobstructed, like grass before wind (*feng* 風).⁶ Coercion, in contrast, at best might create grudging, superficial obedience; at worst it would provoke resistance. Just as Confucius claimed to transmit but not create,⁷ the sage ruler did not actively impose order but kept it going. The key was to find the center and become the axis. Any movement away from that point (activism, *wei* 為) would unbalance the system, but holding firm and still (*wuwei*) would keep it going.

The *Analects* shared with other later Zhou, Warring States, and Han texts this vision of the non-acting ruler, describing if not explaining the nature of his influence through analogy — centripetal like the Pole Star among the multitude of celestial bodies; swaying the masses to conform like wind blowing on grass. The ruler of the 3rd cent B.C.E. text *The Way and Its Virtue/Power* (*Daode jing* 道德經), so distant that his subjects did not know he was there, either produced order because the world automatically ordered itself when left alone, or by emanating a mystical virtue-cum-potency (*de*) — a “primitivist” utopian fantasy attractive in an age of instability, chronic warfare, and intrusive states.⁸

Increasingly, as the Zhou order dissolved, warring states needed to mobilize resources to survive. Rulers displaced heredity-, tradition-, and ritual-based political arrangements with conquests and inter-state compacts of alliance; with bureaucratic jurisdictions governed by meritocratically appointed, evaluated, and compensated officials; with standardized, written administrative and penal codes; and with

⁴ *Lunyu* passage 2.3, *Lunyu yizhu*, Yang Bojun, ann., (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980, 1983), 12.

“Ritual” or “rites” (*li*) here refers most narrowly to sacrifices to ancestors and gods, and to courtly ceremonies. The *Lunyu* extended it to refer to social protocols and to appropriate behavior in general.

⁵ “One who governs through Virtue (*de*) is like the Pole Star. It occupies its place while the host of other stars pay homage to it.” “To rule through non-action, such was [the sage ruler] Shun. How did he do it? He made himself reverent and exactly faced south, and that is all.” *Lunyu* 2.1, 15.4 (pp. 11, 162).

⁶ “The virtue of the Noble Man is like the wind, and the virtue of the small people is like grass. When the wind blows over the grass, the grass must bend.” *Lunyu* 12.19 (p. 129).

⁷ *Lunyu* 7.1 (p. 66).

⁸ Han Feizi (280-233 B.C.E.) shares the idea of non-action as essential to rulership, but relates it to “revealing nothing” as a means of acquiring knowledge and maintaining control over subordinates, not as a means of cultivating a good society for the people. For Han Feizi, order is produced by stringent laws and strict punishments, which people are afraid to break. See Roger T. Ames, *The Art of Rulership: A Study in Ancient Chinese Political Thought*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 47-53.

direct taxation. Most regimes experimented with such institutional innovations piecemeal, but in the western state of Qin statesmen from Shang Yang to Li Si systematized and implemented them with vigor. Qin funded its administrative and military machineries with high levels of state extraction. This left austere living for the populace, a point which theorists gave a moral tone, deeming many activities (including rites and music) superfluous and corrupting, and their producers (including traditionalists (*ru* 儒)) parasites.⁹

Where the *Lunyu*, the *The Way and Its Power*, and the *Mencius* pushed sharply if hopelessly against the tides of reward/punishment or “profit” (*li* 利)-based institutionalization and militarization, *Xunzi* advocated a new synthesis.¹⁰ Rather than pitting ritual against bureaucracy and law, *Xunzi* re-

incorporated “softer” (another connotation of *ru*) “traditional” forms into institutions themselves. In doing so, *Xunzi* produced new language for the particular influence exerted by the ruler’s virtue over the people, “transformation through teaching.”¹¹ Echoing the *Lunyu*, *Xunzi* identified the paragons of transformative sagely rulership as Yao and Shun, who activated it by “facing south and attending to All under Heaven. Among the people, none were not moved to follow them and to transform to accord with them.”¹²

In contrast to the *Lunyu* and *Daode jing*, though, *Xunzi* proposed not to concentrate this transformative role solely in a non-activist ruler, but to distribute it through subordinate offices, in other words, precisely through such administrative apparatuses as had been anathematized in earlier texts.¹³ For

⁹ There is some controversy over the best translation of the term *ru*, sometimes rendered as “Confucian.” In the context of advocating for and advising on the restoration of “traditional” social and political forms, I translate “*ru*” as “Traditionalist.” In the context of basing that restoration on the study of classical texts, I translate “*ru*” as “Classicist.” For the twelfth century, where *ru* is used to label a particular literate style of medical praxis, I translate *ru* as “Scholarly.”

¹⁰ Mencius (Mengzi, 372-289 B.C.E.) was the student of a grandson of Confucius, and famous for his view that human nature is fundamentally “good” and in need of nurture, and for his opposition to “profit” or “benefit” reward structures as a basis for governance. Mencius was successful in his own time in acquiring patronage from rulers and attracting students. *Xunzi* (Xun Kuang, 310-230 B.C.E.) was, like Mencius, a Traditionalist, and famous for his view that human nature is fundamentally “bad” and in need of correction. *Xunzi* had extensive experience as an official, and his book gives detailed recommendations on government institutional structure and function.

¹¹ The *Book of Rites* (*Liji*, perhaps consisting of earlier material, but compiled in the Han), also discusses the ways in which ritual should operate at different levels of the polity and society, inculcating values such as respect for elders and superiors that reinforce hierarchical relationships. It describes the process as “transformation through teaching,” but it does not discuss formally integrating those functions into bureaucratic organs or positions. “Ritual propriety, in its transformation through teaching, is subtle; it stops pernicious [behavior] before it has taken form. It causes people to daily move toward goodness, distance themselves from transgressions, and yet they do not know it. It is because of this that the Former Kings were lavish in [ritual].” (from “Explanation *jingjie*, no. 26), *Liji*, Zheng Xuan, ann., (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe), 15.3b.

¹² Xun Kuang, *Xunzi*, Yang Liang, ann., *Yingyin wenyuange siku quanshu*, 695, (Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1983-1986), 18.5. Translation modified from John Knoblock, *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 18.

¹³ *Xunzi* 9.9, 9.10, 9.19.

“sagely ministers,” as opposed to false, usurping, or merely competent ministers, “administrative orders and transformation through teaching take shape among [the people] below like shadows,” an image again suggesting an instantaneity and faithfulness similar to non-activism’s effects.¹⁴ In his essay listing the distinct functions of various offices, Xunzi assigns the more general duties, “discoursing on rites and music, rectifying personal conduct, broadening transformation through teaching, beautifying mores and customs, encompassing all [with virtue] and harmonizing into unity,” to the high-ranking Duke of the Insignia.¹⁵ *Xunzi* gave new force to the profound, swift, and harmonizing effects of proper music, not only for personal cultivation but for the transformation of the populace, and designated the “Music Master” as ensuring that “barbarous customs and depraved music” do not disrupt proper elegant forms.¹⁶ At the local level, he assigned responsibility for “exhorting to transform through teaching” and “encouraging filial and brotherly devotion” to the District Preceptor.¹⁷

Notably, Xunzi generally located functions that eliminate unwanted behaviors, as opposed to cultivating desirable ones, in separate offices: “Preventing illicit [or licentious] and

extirpating noxious [behaviors], and executing [violators] with the Five Punishments,” are jobs for the Overseer of Criminality. While *Xunzi* does not reject coercive tactics such as military action, criminal punishments, and taxation out of hand, he does recommend them only for short run contingencies, and sees them as ultimately counter-productive. To resort to them is also to fall short: the appearance of rebelliousness and disunity is evidence that the current ruler is not Heaven’s King.¹⁸

Xunzi also makes the effects of “transformation through teaching” and “beautification of mores and customs” concrete and explicit. *Xunzi* saw convention, lacking sagely transformation, as encouraging those impulses toward self-gratification and self-aggrandizement intrinsic to human nature that produce evil in the world. Customs, being particular to plebeian occupations, to regions, and to the current age, were rooted in material life, partial, and oblivious to the common good. Fortunately, in antiquity the perspicacious Sage rulers rose above such limitations. They developed universally valid mores, rites, and music, and left this knowledge to posterity in the form of texts. Classical education, the business of Classicists, could thus not only guide rulers, but serve as a

¹⁴ *Xunzi*, section 13, 9.1b.

¹⁵ *Xunzi* 9.18; translation modified from Knoblock, *Xunzi*, 108.

¹⁶ Erica Brindley, “Music, Cosmos, and the Development of Psychology in Early China,” *Young Pao* 92, no. 1/3, (2006):32-39.

¹⁷ *Xunzi*, section 9.17. The District Preceptor is also responsible first for agricultural production, along with encouraging filial and brotherly devotion and obedience among the “hundred surnames” (commoners).

¹⁸ *Xunzi*, 9.17; also see 9.4-9.9 on the various types of coercive and interfering governance that merely produce disorder, and which sage rulers do not engage in.

foundation for broader, non-literate instruction, for reproducing a more homogeneous, harmonious, and undivided world.¹⁹ Transformed mores and customs produce a well-(hierarchically) ordered society.²⁰

With the imperial-bureaucratic empires of the Qin and then the Han, the ideas of potency emanating from a ruler, bureaucratic administration, and the goal of harmonious unity were woven into increasingly grandiose and elaborate cosmologies. Theorists also continued to debate whether and how classical studies, ritual, music, and virtuous conduct worked to order the empire. Some early Han philosophers deemphasized Classicist-style morality. But courts also placed

great importance on the performance of rites and music and, notably under Emperor Wu, instituted Classical academic studies and granted academy students access to bureaucratic office.²¹ While Han theorists of course differed in important respects, they shared tendencies to create systems organized as macro/microcosms of Heaven, Earth, and Humanity tied together in mutual resonance according to the cycles of Yin-Yang and the Five Phases. It was this milieu that produced the medical texts collected in the *Inner Canon of the Yellow Emperor* (*Huangdi neijing*) and in the *Huainanzi* (ca. 139 b.c.e.), both of which powerfully naturalized the state by embodying it in

¹⁹ Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi are all commonly taken to be representative *ru*.

Note that *Lunyu* 2.3, quoted in footnote 4 above, implies homogeneity to be the goal of governance. The passage, compares the ways in which punishments as opposed to rites “order” (*qi*) people. *Qi* has the sense of making many things uniform, like a field of grain.

²⁰ Mark Edward Lewis, “Custom and Human Nature in Early China,” *Philosophy East and West* (July 2003) 53.3: 308-322; Lewis, *The Construction of Space in Early China*, (Albany: State University Press of New York, 2006), 189-244. Although Mencius shared this faith in the power of textually-transmitted ritual and moral knowledge (albeit for nurturing rather than checking innate tendencies), he did not discuss concrete mechanisms for transformative education.

²¹ Some modern scholars label this type of position “Huang-Lao” (for Yellow (*huang*) Emperor and Laozi), and see it embodied in what Sima Tan labeled the “Lineage of the Dao” and in the *Huainanzi*. Some argue that Huang-Lao was dominant at Han courts before Emperor Wu granted patronage to Dong Zhongshu, established an imperial academy for classical studies, and access to office by recommendation for academy students. See Wang Aihe, *Cosmology and Political Culture in Early China*, 182-185.

physiologies structured as imperial bureaucracies, based on such principles as functionally differentiated administration.²²

Theorists commonly placed the ruler at the nexus of cosmic powers, such that his actions produced responses at all levels.²³ When the emperor harmonized, variously, his body, ritual, music, and policies with cosmic cycles, his potency rippled throughout the world (or, alternatively, pleased Heaven) to produce good weather, good crops, and a peaceful populace. The emperor's failure to synchronize produced cosmic interference (or Heavenly displeasure), manifested in anomalies like comets and monstrous births; natural disasters like floods, drought, epidemics, and plagues of insects; and social disorder and rebellion. Thus, while various cosmological systems differed in politically critical respects, they all tended to concentrate power in the imperial institution. At the same time, theoreticians circumscribed that power by insisting on their own exclusive capacities to translate Heavenly into human norms

and to read and interpret cosmic signs — to guide and critique the emperor and imperial policies.²⁴ Rulers in turn also patronized a range of non-classicist religious and divination specialists — figures vociferously condemned by their rivals as “shamans” (*wu* 巫) and “adepts” (*fangshi* 方士) — who offered more untrammelled access to cosmic powers.²⁵

Han writers such as the classicist Dong Zhongshu (179-104 b.c.e.) extended cosmological analysis to the logographic system, ritual norms, and not least, arguments for transformative over coercive governance:

When the ruler desires to act, it is suitable to seek its beginnings in Heaven. The Way of Heaven is great, and resides in Yin and Yang. Yang action is virtue; Yin action is punishments. Heaven causes Yang to constantly reside in the great summer, where it takes generation and growth, and lengthening and nurturing [life] as its affairs. [Heaven causes] Yin to

²² Han cosmology naturalized the imperial bureaucratic structure as emergent from the patterned rhythms of the cosmos. The body was taken as a microcosm with homologous structures and cycles, including functionally differentiated “official posts”/sense organs (*guan*). In this system the order/health of the realm depended on matching policies and state rituals to cosmic cycles ordered in patterns of Yin-Yang and the Five Phases. Failure to harmonize with the cosmos could produce, for example, rebellions, epidemics, drought, or famine. Responsibility concentrated in the position of the emperor, taken as a nexus of the “Three Powers,” Heaven, Earth, and Humanity. Health similarly depended on harmonizing behavior and diet with the seasons. See Nathan Sivin, “State, Cosmos, and the Body in the Last Three Centuries B.C.,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 55, no. 1 (June 1995): 5-37. The *Huainanzi* is commonly considered a “Huang-Lao” work, and more associated with “nurturing life” or immortality than with medical healing. On the influence of nurturing life practices on the development of *Inner Canon*-style medicine, see Vivienne Lo, “The Influence of Nurturing Life Culture on the Development of Western Han Acumoxa Therapy,” in Elisabeth Hsu, ed., *Innovation in Chinese Medicine*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 19-50

²³ Keith Knapp has shown that, from the Later Han, records also show stories of miraculous cosmic or spirit responses not only to the emperor but to regular individual's exceptional filial behavior. See *Selfless Offspring: Filial Children and Social Order in Medieval China*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005), 85-112.

²⁴ Despite this ideological maneuver, some have argued that Han institutions did not in fact contain a balance of power between officials and the imperial court, but concentrated it in the latter. For reviews and different assessments of the arguments, see Mark Edward Lewis, *The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han*, (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 51-74; Wang Aihe, *Cosmology and Political Culture in Early China*, 173-207.

²⁵ Here, I skip over the conflicting political positions worked out through cosmology discourse in the Han. For an important treatment, see Wang Aihe, *Cosmology and Political Culture in Early China*. On omen interpretation, see especially pp. 164-180, on rivalry with “shamans” and *fangshi*, see pp. 175-179.

constantly reside in the great winter, where it accumulates in a place of emptiness and non-use. From this you can see that Heaven employs virtue and does not employ punishments. Yang emanates and spreads, enacting above, and masters the achievement of the annual harvest. Yin enters and lies dormant, storing below, and with the [changing] seasons comes out to assist Yang. Yang does not become the assistant of Yin, and further is not able by itself to achieve the annual harvest. The ruler undertakes the intent of Heaven in his handling of affairs. Thus he devotes himself to teaching through virtue (*dejiào*) and is sparing in administering punishments. Punishments cannot be employed in governing the world, and furthermore Yin cannot be employed to achieve the harvest. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, Dong Zhongshu naturalized the governance of “teaching through virtue” by rooting it in a cosmology even more powerfully holistic than the *Analects*’ invocation of the Pole Star. Like the *Analects* and *Xunzi*, Dong also legitimized it in the unassailable standard of a mythical antiquity, when throughout the world, he claimed, not a single person was in prison. He points to a decline, with rulers increasingly departing from the Way, beginning in the later Zhou and peaking in the Qin, leaving a realm so thoroughly corrupted by coercive rule that it has become impossible, for now, to entirely dispense with it.²⁶

²⁶ For Han writers justifying Han’s acquisition of Heaven’s Mandate and recommending what they hoped to be stronger and morally better foundations for imperial governance, Qin became a convenient icon for tyrannical and unstable rule built upon highly articulated bureaucratic offices and codes, and on heavy punishments. Thus, although the early Han regime in fact maintained many of Qin’s institutional structures and legal practices, it also pointedly lowered taxes (at first), issued amnesties, and as we will see, institutionalized moral governance.

²⁷ Dong continues with an appeal to ancient (and therefore unassailable models), and for the long term utility of classicist. Quoted by Ban Gu in *Hanshu* 22, “Treatise on Rites and Music #2.”

Today the Han has followed after the Qin, and although they desire to govern, there is nothing they can do. Laws are issued and treachery ensues; orders go down and swindles arise. Those imprisoned in one year number in the thousands and tens of thousands. Ever since the Han acquired All under Heaven, it has always desired to govern well, but yet unto the present it has been unable to overcome violence and get rid of killing [capital punishments]. ... Men of antiquity said, “Standing on the edge of the gorge with your mouth watering for fish, is not as good as going home to tie together a net.” Today, standing on the edge of governance and wishing to administer it for over seventy years, is not as good as stepping back and attending to further transformation. After further transformation, we will be able to have fine administration, calamities will daily recede, and good fortune will daily advance.²⁷

Like Xunzi before him, Dong argued not for immediately abandoning penal law, but for the long term desirability of “transformative” governance. Like Xunzi, in Dong’s more concrete proposals, he calls for institutionalizing transformative rule by “establishing great learning ... and setting up local schools” — thus carving out an essential guiding role for classical scholar-educators like himself. Also like Xunzi, Dong

located transformative and administrative roles in functionally distinct organs and positions, separating classicist education from “officials’ enforcement of the law to govern the people.”²⁸

In Han conceptions, the fount of transformative governance — governance not through force but through mystical or virtuous potency — was the emperor. Some Han texts envisioned a mores-transcending imperial power extending through functionally differentiated bureaucratic-legal organs, creating harmonious order without moral instruction or exemplification. With the fragmentation of the Han empire into multiple and short-lived states, discourses of transformative governance came to locate the sources of virtuous potency, a property of Han emperors, more in local officials. This was a period in which the central government may have had less control over local officials than at any other time in imperial history. Here, it is not that local officials were institutionally charged with the function of transformative education or with modeling morality, but that, like the cosmic-nexus sovereign of theory, their goodness itself emanated transformative powers. Their potency manifested, for example, in commoners’ spontaneous acts of benevolence, and in magical protections for humans and animals against sickness and violence within the borders of their jurisdictions.²⁹ In later centuries, we continue to see life-nurturing and morally transformative potency attributed to both emperors and officials, and both positive and negative omens read as divine or cosmic responses to their rule. Classicist learning and rites continued to receive support from most imperial courts, albeit most often along with other

teachings and ritual systems, including Daoist and Buddhist ones.

Extension to the Locale

Some time before Dong Zhongshu appeared on the scene, Han state-builders worked transformative governance not only into prescriptions for imperial or official morality and ritual decorum, but into functionally distinct architectures that extended into local societies. Extant passages regarding those measures do not actually use the term *jiaohua* itself, but we can infer their Traditionalist affiliations from their content (inculcating filial and brotherly devotion) and from cues in their language (*jiao* “to teach”).

Han decrees, beginning from 201 B.C.E., dictated that local officials select for each township as Elder an older man of cultivated conduct, to be charged with teaching and shepherding the multitudes in goodness. They also chose someone who was especially “Filial and Brotherly” to inculcate All under Heaven in proper submissiveness, and someone “Diligent in Agriculture” as the “foundation of livelihoods.” Periodically, the court attached to these positions tax and corvée service remissions, and grants of grain or cloth. In addition to elevating these three categories of local exemplars and periodically granting them privileges, the state instituted for local officials special honors for incorruptibility, to serve as “models for commoners.” In addition, beginning in 1 B.C.E., decrees also honored exceptionally chaste wives and obedient daughters, and one prohibited excessive cults and licentious music. Under the Later Han, as substitution for such inimical

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Keith N. Knapp, “Magistrates and Miracles: The Supernatural Arsenal of Fine Officials in Early Medieval China,” unpublished paper delivered at panel “The Mandate of Heaven at the Local Level in Imperial China,” Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, March 27, 2009.

ritual variants, we find orders for the organization of township libation ceremonies. As an adjunct to bureaucratic control of its diverse localities, then, the Han state, from its beginnings, took seriously the promotion of common values based on hierarchical family relationships and agricultural production, eventually adding regulation and promotion of correct ritual forms to its repertoire of governing devices.³⁰

Approaches to “transformative governance” as it applied to locales and to commoners varied over time. The few records of such policies left by states of the Period of Division (220 C.E.-589 C.E.) consisted mainly of honors granted for the exceptional performance of filial values. The predominant pattern for the Tang (618-907) was the periodic conferrals of banners, especially for sons’ devotion and grandsons’ obedience. State finances entered into consideration, as in accommodations made in Tang tax and service structures in order to mitigate family fragmentation (splitting into multiple residences in order to lighten burdens on “extra” adult males), which was considered damaging to family morality.³¹

Beginning in the Han, “transformation through teaching” also included periodic and localized campaigns aimed at culturally integrating the southern frontiers. Reforms of southerners tended to focus on worship of “demons” (i.e., the local deities), and respected local religious officants (*wu*, usually translated “shaman,” but as used by officials in those contexts meaning something more like “witchdoctor”). In the tenth and eleventh centuries, southern “transformation” intensified into policies mobilized at the level of imperial edict, and aimed not only at shamans but at local healing customs, such as quarantine, taken, again, to be divisive to families. Song dynasty local officials developed innovative approaches, such as distributing printed medical texts to shamans.³²

Individually, activist officials could perform transformative governance through exhortations to the local populace. Moral principles such as filiality were also built into legal codes, for example with high penalties for crimes committed by sons toward fathers, and low or no penalties for crimes committed by fathers toward sons. Judicial practice could thus also serve as a

³⁰ *Cefu yuangui* 59.624-626.

³¹ *Cefu yuangui* 59. 624-626.

³² For a broad overview of such policies during the imperial period, see Miyakawa Hisayuki, “The Confucianization of South China,” *The Confucian Persuasion*, ed., Arthur F. Wright, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), 21-46. On the deployment of medical texts in Song transformative governance, see TJ Hinrichs, “Governance through Medical Texts and the Role of Print,” in *Transmission and Transformation of Knowledge in China, Tenth-Fourteenth Centuries*, Lucille Chia and Hilde de Weerd, eds., (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 218-238.

venue for moral instruction.³³ Some late imperial emperors, notably the Ming founder, Taizu (r. 1368-1398), and the Qing emperors Kangxi (r. 1662-1722) and Yongzheng (r. 1722-1735), took a more direct and personal approach, for example having moral exhortations read directly to the populace in village lectures.³⁴

In the twentieth century, modern communication and transportation technologies offered powerful new means for states to disseminate ideas — propaganda in the service of nation-building and mass mobilization. It is beyond the scope of this course, but you might consider whether and in what ways modern phenomena such as “propaganda,” “nation-building,” and “mass mobilization” are of a different order from “premodern” transformative governance. What are the continuities, and what are the ruptures?

³³ See, Brian E. McKnight and James T. C. Liu, trans., *The Enlightened Judgments: Ch'ing-Ming Chi: The Sung Dynasty Collection*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), for example, 63-65, 371-380, 476-482; and discussion in Jiang Yonglin, *The Great Ming Code: Da Ming Lü*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 50-58.

³⁴ “Ming Taizu: Placard for the Instruction of the People,” *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, Vol. 1: *From Earliest Times to 1600*. William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds., (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 788-791; “Village Lectures and the Sacred Edict,” *Sources of Chinese Tradition Volume 2: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century*, Wm. Theodore de Bary and Richard Lufrano, eds., (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 70-72.